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The theme of this Federal Reserve Bank of Boston symposium is
captured in its title and in the following statement, distributed in
advance to all participants:
Various proposals to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking
system have been debated in recent years, and some of these proposals have
been enacted into law. But the debate, and the legis!afive changes, have
generally focused on limiting losses to the deposit insurance funds in order to
protect taxpayers, rather than on the broader implications for the banking
system and its role in financial markets and the economy. Furthermore, most
proposals have not been considered in the context of financial cycles, where
changing economic circumstances may reveal risk exposures and the poten-
tial for widespread losses in important segments of the banking industry.
Examples include the money center banks’ exposure to loans to less devel-
oped countries around 1980 and the commercial real estate boom and bust
cycles in New England and parts of the Mid-Atlantic region in the late 1980s.
The focus of the symposium will be to examine the likely effectiveness of
the various proposals for change in the context of financial cycles and the role
of banking in the economy.
In the first paper, Richard Randall of the Boston Fed described the
recent financial cycles that severely damaged the United States banking
system. The pattern of these cycles made clear, he argued, that actions
to limit the damage to the banking system and the economy must come
when risk concentrations are being built and well before a boom turns
sour. Tough responses after problems become evident tend to be
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procyclical and can increase the ultimate damage. Randall argued that
timely supervisory intervention against excessive risk concentrations
could avoid or substantially moderate the distress caused by financial
cycles.
The other three papers advocated enhancing market discipline as
the way to protect the banking system. George Benston called for more
capital in banks, with a significant proportion in the form of subordi-
nated debt. Arthur Rolnick advocated coinsurance, where losses are
shared between depositors and the insurance fund. James Pierce pre-
sented a proposal for functional banking akin to narrow bank and core
bank proposals that had previously been made by others.
Both in the formal discussion of the four papers by Robert Litan and
Alton Gilbert and in the general discussion that followed, sharp differ-
ences of opinion were apparent. Some attributed the banking problems
primarily to euphoric overlending and lemming-like overconcentration
in the same types of assets. Others stressed the moral hazard caused by
the perverse incentives of deposit insurance, inadequate market disci-
pline, and supervisors’ forbearance with respect to failing institutions.
Many were skeptical that supervisors could be depended on to take
unpopular actions against unwise risk-taking in a euphoric boom, but
several felt that a combination of supervisory and market discipline
responses to risk-taking was worth trying. Among the alternative
market discipline proposals, none emerged as a clear winner. This
overview summarizes the four papers and discussion, highlighting key
themes and areas of controversy.
Safeguarding the Banking System
from Financial Cycles
The lead-off paper by Richard Randall of the Boston Fed describes
financial cycles not as recurring phenomena but as cycles through
various phases--as in boom and bust cycles. Typically, a number of
banks developed abnormal risk concentrations during periods of rapid
growth in a particular area of activity. As growth continued, the
expansion became euphoric and credit standards deteriorated, although
actual loan problems remained within normal bounds. Eventually the
economic underpinnings of the activity weakened, as a result of external
factors or overdevelopment. The market psychology turned negative,
values collapsed, and losses developed that wiped out capital in
numerous banks and seriously weakened others.
Randall catalogs the more destructive of the recent financial cycles,
noting the timing and nature of successive phases, the economic forces
responsible, and the resulting damage. He estimates that about three-
quarters of U.S. bank failures in the past 20 years, as measured by assetsAN OVERVIEW
rather than numbers of banks, relate to financial cycles, and only about
one-quarter to isolated situations. This estimate does not include the
money center banks, which were severely damagedin the early 1980s by
a financial cycle involving loans to less developed countries. Randall
notes that those banks, with assets well in excess of the assets of all
failed banks, eventually sustained losses on developing country credits
nearly equal to their capital at the time when such loans peaked.
Randall argues that financial cycles have critical implications for
policy options in safeguarding the banking system. Once risks have
been built in and economic factors begin to weaken, little can be done to
avoid future losses. But problems are not apparent before this point.
Thus, to be effective, action to head off severe losses must be taken in
response to excessive risk concentrations, and well before indicators
such as nonperforming assets exceed normal levels. Capital ratios of
banks weaken relatively late in the cycle, long after risk exposures have
been built in and losses are inevitable.
Based on his earlier research, Randall contends that market forces
have not reacted to excessive risk-taking, only to actual evidence of
problem loans. He finds no basis for relying on market discipline to head
off future financial cycles. He further argues that proposals to increase
market discipline generally also increase the vulnerability of the banking
system to systemic crisis. In a context of financial cycles that simulta-
neously expose numerous banks, often including the largest, to failure
and near-failure conditions, it would be unwise to experiment with
changes that would increase the vulnerability of the system, he contends.
Randall proposes, instead, a program of direct supervisory action
against excessive risk-taking by individual banks. Such actions were
once understood to be part of the supervisor’s job, he notes, and that
role has taken on new significance with the prevalence of major financial
cycles. He suggests that heading off financial cycles is the most critical
task of bank supervisors. Such a program need not add to the regulatory
burden, and can be controlled to avoid credit allocation on any basis
other than risk.
Randall’s proposal is intended to act countercyclically with respect
to financial cycles (but not the business cycle, per se). He contends that
the forces of market discipline tend to come too late and have a
procyclical effect, aggravating the depressed phase of the cycle. The
same is true of "prompt corrective action" tied to deterioration in capital
ratios, higher capital requirements and deposit insurance premiums for
banks with weakened supervisory ratings, and market value accounting.
The current focus on protecting the taxpayers from bank failures is
misdirected, Randall argues. The banking industry supports the deposit
insurance fund, and only if the banking industry were overwhelmed
with losses would the taxpayer be called upon. The preservation of the
country’s banking system is essential to the economy, the paymentsRichard E. Randall
system, and the social fabric. The government must be prepared to do
what is necessary to avoid chaotic failure of large segments of the
banking system. This does not mean protecting individual banks from
failure, but it does have implications for the way bank failures are
handled and for avoiding unnecessary failures of marginal banks.
According to Randall, "narrow" or "functional" bank reform proposals
are designed to protect the deposit insurance funds and not the banking
industry, and therefore do not address the real problem.
To summarize, Randall stresses the significance of financial cycles
in recent banking problems and for bank reform. He advocates super-
visory action against excessive risk concentrations as the only reform
with a reasonable prospect for timely countercyclical action, while
rejecting market discipline proposals as procyclical and potentially
destabilizing.
Market Discipline: The Role of Uninsured
Depositors and Other Market Participants
George Benston of Emory University focuses on how to counteract
the moral hazard engendered by the safety net of government-provided
deposit insurance, and the relatively low equity capital ratios tolerated
in the banking industry. He favors restricting deposit insurance as a
means of generating market discipline and argues that objections to this
approach are invalid. In particular, he takes issue with the following
arguments:
1. Uninsured depositors are unlikely to be able to monitor banks or
to do so in a timely fashion.
2. Even if they could do so, the additional interest that depositors
would require on uninsured deposits would be insufficient to
alter bank behavior.
3. Once weaknesses are noted, uninsured depositors are likely to
withdraw their funds (run) rather than continue to monitor a bank.
In dismissing the first objection, Benston points out that much
information on banks’ performance is available. Banks must disclose
considerable information, including nonperforming loans and loan loss
provisions, and several private firms sell analyses and ratings of the
condition of banks. The federal agencies examine banks in detail and
summaries of their reports could be made available to the public. (They
are not disclosed at present.) Benston also argues that most corporate
financial statements are more difficult to analyze than those of banks,
yet these corporations regularly issue debt that is not guaranteed by the
government. Thus, depositors could assess the risk taken by their
banks, at least to the extent that creditors of corporations generally canAN OVERVIEW
do so. Benston notes that while the large bank losses on loans to real
estate developers and oil producers were not predicted by the market for
bank stocks, apparently they were also not predicted by bank managers
or by the regulatory authorities.
With regard to the second objection, Benston observes that most
studies show at least some risk penalty in the rates required to issue
large certificates of deposit and subordinated debt. This has been so
even though most of the banks studied were large enough to be
considered "too-big-to-fail," and most depositors have had good reason
to assume that they would probably be paid in full, if the bank failed.
Thus, Benston concludes that truly uninsured deposits would require
risk premia sufficiently large to influence the risk choices of banks.
Regarding the likelihood of depositor runs, Benston does not
appear to be concerned about runs on seriously damaged individual
banks, but he carefully analyzes the potential for systemic bank runs. He
argues that if depositors believe that their funds are at risk, market
pressures will force banks to increase their capital and diversify their
risks to provide assurance to their customers, just as nonbanks do. And
under the provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act
of 1991 (FDICIA) for prompt corrective action, discount window con-
straint, and on-site supervision, banks will be closed promptly when
capital falls below the minimum level, thus reducing the supervisory
caseload. Moreover, solvency evaluations will always be current for all
banks with more than $10 billion in assets.
Faced with a market test, banks would structure themselves to
avoid runs, differentiating themselves from problem banks, raising
additional capital or merging with stronger banks, or even liquidating
themselves to avoid progressive weakening. Benston also cites studies
showing that there is little evidence that bank runs have been conta-
gious, causing the failure of solvent banks. Nevertheless, he concludes
that the scenario of likely runs on a number of large banks, as presented
by Randall in an earlier article, is overstated but plausible. However,
Benston sees this risk as stemming from banks’ low capital ratios and the
fact that some banks are considered too large to have their costs inflicted
on uninsured depositors, both conditions that Benston has consistently
proposed eliminating.
Benston reviews various methods of limiting deposit insurance
coverage, noting that if deposit runs are of concern, coinsurance might
be less desirable since depositors will wish to avoid losses on even a
portion of their funds. He also cites various reasons why it may not be
fully effective to limit insurance to demand or very short-term deposits,
or to give preference to depositors over other creditors.
In sum, Benston finds that uninsured depositors can provide timely
market discipline and that the danger of systemic runs on solvent banks,
if it exists, can be removed by actions taken by these banks. Neverthe-Richard E. Randall
less, he concludes that the incentives affecting bank regulatory author-
ities will cause them to continue to act in most cases to prevent losses to
depositors of large banks. Consequently, he suggests turning to another
source of market discipline--subordinated debt.
Benston calls for considering subordinated debt on a par with
equity capital, as it serves to absorb losses that would be imposed on the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Such debt should have a
remaining maturity of at least two years. Because the holders of such
debt cannot run and do not benefit if the bank does well, they have
every incentive to require a higher rate of interest if the bank takes more
risks. Equity holders are less desirable sources of market discipline
because they have upside as well as downside potential and, particu-
larly in banks with low or declining capital, may have incentives to
encourage greater risk-taking. Furthermore, subordinated debt can
probably be sold at a cost lower than that of issuing additional equity.
Benston’s earlier proposal (jointly with George Kaufman) for struc-
tured early intervention and resolution has been largely, but insuffi-
ciently in Benston’s opinion, adopted in FDICIA. The Benston/Kaufman
concept calls for capital to be measured after adjusting assets and
liabilities to market values. Banks would attract supervisory concern
when capital fell below 10 percent of assets, and the level of concern and
stringency of supervisory constraint would increase as capital ratios fell.
In the final category, capital below 3 percent of assets; quick recapital-
ization, merger, or liquidation would be the alternatives.
With adequate capital and the market discipline imposed by the
holders of subordinated debt, deposits could be fully insured in order to
avoid the inequity imposed on smaller banks by the "too-big-to-fail"
practice. Furthermore, banks with adequate capital could be relieved of
close supervision and of almost all restrictions on assets and on banking
activities.
Thus, while Benston believes that depositor discipline, in conjunc-
tion with higher capital and early intervention in failing banks, could
protect the banking system, he fears that the actions of regulatory
authorities in handling large troubled banks will nullify depositor
discipline. He therefore opts for subordinated debt holders to be the pro-
viders of market discipline, permitting full insurance for all depositors.
Market Discipline as a Regulator of Bank Risk
Arthur Rolnick of the Minneapolis Fed traces the history of banking
panics from the free banking era that began in 1837 up to the establish-
ment of the FDIC in 1934. Deposit insurance brought stability to banking
and an end to banking panics, but it created another problem--moral
hazard.AN OVERVIEW
This new problem did not dearly manifest itself until it was
recognized that deposit insurance was in reality unlimited, particularly
at the larger banks. The authorities’ handling of the Continental Illinois
failure in 1984, when all depositors were protected, made this clear, if it
had not been earlier. Between 1985 and 1990, fully 99 percent of
uninsured deposits at all failed banks were protected by the FDIC.
With full insurance, depositors have no reason to worry about the
risks their banks take, and banks need not pay a risk premium on
deposits. Assuming that riskier assets generally yield higher returns and
that bank stockholders are so well diversified that they are risk neutral
or can readily hedge their risk, it follows that banks best serve their
shareholders by taking on the riskiest portfolio possible. This is the
essence of moral hazard, the incentive to increase risk beyond what
would otherwise be considered prudent limits.
Rolnick contends that the experiences of both the savings and loan
and the banking industries in the 1980s provide evidence of moral
hazard induced by deposit insurance and of the failure of the regulators
of both industries to contain that moral hazard. While regulation might
be improved, regulators cannot control risk, because without a profit
test they have no basis for determining the optimal amount of risk.
Furthermore, when banks gamble in their risk-taking, regulators cannot
monitor banks closely enough to close them in time to avoid losses to the
insurance fund.
Rolnick goes back into history again to support his argument that,
in the absence of full deposit protection, the market can discipline bank
behavior. Depositor exposure reintroduces the possibility of bank runs,
so a trade-off exists between moral hazard and bank panics. But Rolnick
sees the Federal Reserve System as better able to contain panics than it
was in the 1930s, so the trade-off today is less severe.
Nevertheless, Rolnick is concerned that regulatory authorities will
consider it advisable to protect uninsured depositors when a large bank
is failing, even though the appropriate long-term strategy calls for
introducing more depositor discipline by not protecting them. He
therefore advocates coinsurance, because the commitment to impose
losses on depositors can be made more credible where individual
depositors lose only a fraction of their exposure.I The probability of
widespread bank runs following the failure of a large bank would be
reduced because far more of the funds of large depositors would be
covered. Consequently, the authorities would have little rationale for
protecting uninsured depositors.
1 An example of coinsurance would be for depositors to be insured for 80 percent of
their deposits. Because coinsurance can be phased in gradually, Rolnick notes that it
would not be necessary to determine the optimal level in advance.Richard E. Randall
In sum, Rolnick seeks a means of limiting the moral hazard
engendered by deposit insurance, while minimizing the risk of either
banking panics or supervisory reluctance to force losses on depositors of
large banks. He concludes that coinsurance is the best alternative.
The Functional Approach to
Deposit Insurance and Regulation
James Pierce of the University of California at Berkeley proposes a
radical restructuring of the financial system in terms of deposit insur-
ance, supervision, powers, and the federal safety net. The concept is
similar to "narrow bank" and "core bank" proposals.
After a transition period, what are now called banks would be
divided into two parts, monetary service companies and financial
service companies. Monetary service companies could accept only
transaction accounts, which would be guaranteed by the government
and on which they could pay interest. Monetary service companies
would be limited to holding high-quality, short-term assets and would
be closely supervised. The financial service companies, on the other
hand, could accept any type of deposit, but without deposit insurance,
and would be unrestricted in their lending activities.
These two "companies" could operate as integral parts of a broader
financial entity engaged in any combination of financial services. No
"fire-wall" requirements would be imposed, so that synergies need not
be impaired.2 But a monetary service company could not be the creditor
of any other parts of the organization or be responsible for their debts,
and it would have to be adequately and independently capitalized.
Thus, the functional approach is designed to isolate a unique and
critical bank function that regulators believe must be protected to avoid
payments system disruptions in a time of general bank distress. Pierce
points out that the efficiency of the payments system would be signifi-
cantly diminished if sellers of goods and services had to verify the
soundness not only of buyers, but also of the buyers’ banks, and
therefore he proposes 100 percent insurance of transaction accounts. He
sees no need to offer deposit insurance on time deposits, and accord-
ingly no need to supervise the quality of credit or the adequacy of capital
in the non-monetary portion of the organization.
Pierce envisions the Federal Reserve as the supervisor of the
monetary service companies and the FDIC as its subsidiary to adminis-
ter a federal insurance program for transaction accounts. The other bank
For instance, the same employees could handle transactions in both companies.AN OVERVIEW
and thrift regulators would be eliminated. While monetary service
companies would have normal access to the discount window, financial
service companies would have only emergency access in the event of a
severe loss of liquidity. Insolvent institutions could not be bailed out.
Pierce argues that the functional approach probably would not
adversely affect the supply or cost of business loans, but even if it did,
he favors subsidizing such lending directly rather than financing it with
insured deposits. He asserts that small banks would not be hurt by the
loss of deposit insurance on the bulk of their liabilities.
Pierce also rejects arguments that the absence of prudential super-
vision would increase the danger of financial instability in the financial
service companies. Deprived of deposit insurance and the protection of
"too-big-to-fail," large creditors might be expected to withdraw funds at
maturity if they perceive a problem. Monetarist economists should not
be concerned because the central bank can maintain the money stock
and bank monetary functions would be completely protected. Other
economists might be concerned that a breakdown in the stock market or
commercial paper market would result in a "flight to quality." Borrow-
ers with asymmetric-information problems ("opaque" loans) would face
higher rates or be rationed out of the market.3 But Pierce argues that the
Federal Reserve can soften these effects by providing liquidity. To the
extent that financial service companies are unable to roll over maturing
debt, or are forced to sell opaque assets at substantial losses, some may
fail. But even during a panic, when creditors demand payment from a
number of financial service companies, few will demand currency and a
large part of the withdrawn funds will be invested in the securities of
solvent financial service companies. Furthermore, the monetary service
companies may use funds borrowed from the Federal Reserve to buy
market instruments issued by sound financial service corporations.
Market discipline in financial service corporations will result in
stronger capital positions, better control of failures, and avoidance of
stampedes into risk concentrations such as those experienced in the
1980s. Pierce contends that occasional interventions by supervisors to
protect creditors of large institutions, in extraordinary circumstances,
would not nullify market discipline once functional banking is achieved.
He hopes, however, that with money and payments safe, the authorities
would be no more likely to bail out a financial service company than
they would an auto company, a defense contractor, or a city.
3 As financial intermediaries, banks make business loans that cannot be readily
handled by markets directly. The business loan portfolio of a typical commercial bank
consists of numerous loans of various types and in various industries, involving detailed
financial information, non-standard terms, and often collateral handling and periodic
on-site visits and inspections. Such loans are sometimes referred to as being "opaque," in
contrast to more "transparent" credits that trade in the commercial paper market.10 Richard E. Randall
Thus, Pierce would create a mechanism so that today’s banking
functions could be carried on within any type of financial firm, with
deposit insurance limited to transaction accounts and market discipline
replacing supervision in safeguarding the riskier activities.
Prepared Discussant Comments
The first discussant, Robert Litan of the U.S. Department of Justice,
was not convinced by Richard Randall that supervisors can forecast
future problems better than bank depositors, shareholders, and credi-
tors.4 Although he saw no harm in supervisors doing their best to
dissuade bank managements from overly risky concentrations, he also
saw the possibility that politicians would pressure supervisors to back
off. He agreed with Randall that warnings by supervisors are best
conveyed on a case-by-case, judgmental basis.
Litan stressed the importance of higher capital ratios as a major
benefit of greater market discipline. He rejected coinsurance because it
entails the risk of runs, which policymakers would not tolerate in the
case of large banks. Litan sees subordinated debt as clearly the superior
source of market discipline. He would require all large banks to have
outstanding a minimum amount of subordinated debt.
Litan, a long-time supporter of narrow (or functional) banking,
regards this approach as the ultimate in market-based solutions because
all opaque lending would be subject to a market test. Narrow banking
would remove most of the need for supervision and what Litan calls
political cycles from the lending process. But the possibility remains of
a run in the commercial paper market, which would be largely funding
the financial service companies. Litan believes that the danger of
systemic runs could be handled by open market operations and the
discount window, but the concerns of policymakers are likely to delay
serious consideration of the concept.
Litan’s ideas for the transition to functional banking differ some-
what from Pierce’s, and he would not impose narrow banking on small
banks. Rather, Litan favors starting with a voluntary program tied to the
acquisition of broader bank powers.
Litan also commented on a proposal being advanced by Bert Ely,
consultant, and others for private deposit insurance through cross-
guarantees. A serious problem with the concept is that while the risk
will be assumed by various insurance syndicates, the government will
be backstopping the system. It is inevitable, then, that government
4 Litan made clear that he was presenting his own views and not those of the Clinton
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authorities would want to supervise the syndicates, and to do that they
must have knowledge of the condition of the larger bank and nonbank
syndicate members. So, what do we gain in the end? Litan related his
personal experience in attempting to establish a company to insure
pools of bank loans. Potential financial backers viewed banks as blind
asset pools, and the attempt was unsuccessful.
In conclusion, Litan suggested a combination of mandatory subor-
dinated debt and supervisory warnings of excessive risk concentrations
and perhaps, in the future, a transition to narrow banks.
The other discussant, Alton Gilbert of the St. Louis Fed, expressed
disappointment that the three papers proposing market discipline
reforms did not discuss how their proposals would safeguard the
banking system in an environment of financial cycles. He sees a
potential for procyclical lending behavior associated with strict enforce-
ment of higher capital requirements or steps being taken to obtain
depositor discipline. He agrees with Randall that some FDICIA provi-
sions are akin to "shooting the wounded."
Gilbert has reservations, however, about the ability of supervisors
to measure risk concentrations and overcome political interference. But
his more fundamental concern is Randall’s view that the basic cause of
bank risk problems is the irrational animal spirits of people caught up in
boom-time euphoria, rather than moral hazard stemming from deposit
insurance. This view, unique in the literature of banking risk, could
have sweeping policy implications because it could be interpreted to
mean that the danger is not confined to depository institutions. This
could, in turn, suggest that the supervisors’ role should be expanded to
moderate financial cycles in all forms of financial intermediation. This
possible interpretation disturbs Gilbert, given the abundant evidence
worldwide that market participants allocate resources better than gov-
ernment agents.
With respect to Benston’s proposals, Gilbert is skeptical that a
modest increase in capital ratios would help much. He also questions
the value of "prompt corrective action," noting that very few failing
banks have taken on additional risk once they became seriously dam-
aged.
Gilbert devotes most of his remarks to one critical assumption
underlying James Pierce’s functional bank proposal: that the govern-
ment can ensure the safe operation of the payments system by insuring
only transaction accounts and supervising only the risks related to such
accounts and the offsetting assets. Gilbert argues that monetary service
companies will have to hold balances at other banks, including foreign
banks, and thus will assume some credit risk. Monetary service compa-
nies will also need to extend intraday credit to customers, including
financial service companies, to facilitate the smooth functioning of the
payments system. In these areas ongoing credit analysis and corre-12 Richard E. Randall
sponding supervisory overview will still be required. Thus, Pierce’s
proposal does not deliver what was promised: protection of the pay-
ments system and elimination of supervisory review of bank credit risk.
Gilbert’s choice among the proposals for bank reform is coinsurance
as proposed by Arthur Rolnick. Coinsurance would enhance market
discipline by making it more palatable for supervisors to close the largest
banks. Closing a bank with a high percentage of deposits covered by
insurance would be less disruptive to the banking system under a
system of coinsurance than with the current limits on coverage.
General Discussion: A Summary
The symposium participants represented a wide range of views
regarding bank reform. While many, if not most, of the participants
support some form of expanded market discipline as the preferred
ingredient for a safer banking system, they have long debated among
themselves the merits of various proposals. Several were prominent
advocates of the concept that the principal underlying cause of the
extraordinary banking and thrift problems of the 1980s was moral
hazard, induced by deposit insurance, low levels of bank capital, the
idea of "’too-big-to-fail," and regulatory forbearance toward failing
banks. Their focus was protecting the taxpayer from future losses
related to deposit insurance, and it was largely because of their success
in pushing their ideas that Congress passed FDICIA.
With its characterization of recent financial cycles, the lead-off paper
suggested a very different explanation for recent banking problems and
made a case for drawing separate lessons from the banking and thrift
crises. As discussant Alton Gilbert pointed out, Randall sees the
problem as primarily one of excessive growth and concentration of risk
in a euphoric boom, not moral hazard. In the general discussion, several
people commented on the apparent herd mentality of bankers, which
resulted in similar risk concentrations in many banks. Those who
commented on financial cycles generally agreed that we should expect
to see more cycles of this type in the future. The strongest supporters of
the moral hazard theory advanced their positions forcefully, but gener-
ally did not respond directly to the implications of financial cycles.
Randall’s proposal for supervisory action to head off dangerous risk
concentrations drew only limited, qualified support as a substitute for
market discipline, but somewhat broader support as an idea worth
trying in conjunction with changes to enhance market discipline. Market
discipline supporters dismissed the notion that supervisors could fore-
cast better than markets, and they doubted that supervisors could stand
up to political pressure when the time came to slow credit growth in a
boom. The discussion featured interplay between those anxious toAN OVERVIEW 13
enhance depositor-imposed market discipline and those concerned about
the potentially destabilizing effects of increasing depositor exposure.
A sharp divergence of opinion also emerged concerning the rele-
vance of the thrift experience in designing safeguards for the banking
system. Some supported Randall’s contention that the regulatory envi-
ronment of the savings and loans was unique, and that the focus of
inquiry should be on what went wrong with the FDIC-insured banks.
Others put much of the blame on regulatory forbearance, which FDICIA
was designed to combat, without distinguishing between bank and
thrift experiences.
Several participants criticized the early intervention and prompt
corrective action provisions of FDICIA. They viewed them as procycli-
cal, in that supervisory actions are tied to declines in capital ratios, a
lagging indicator. These provisions were blamed for aggravating the
"credit crunch" that accompanied the New England banking failures,
and for making it more difficult for damaged banks to recover. Some
complained that FDICIA represented overregulation and was unneces-
sarily inflexible.
George Kaufman of Loyola University and others defended the law
and indicated that it is having its intended effect of forcing more losses
on uninsured depositors. Capital ratios are improving rapidly, in part
because of enhanced market discipline, and regulatory forbearance is
less evident.
James Pierce’s proposal for functional banking inspired consider-
able discussion. On the one hand, it was suggested that the proposal did
not go far enough because it called for full insurance of transaction
accounts. On the other, concern was expressed about the effects of
widespread failures of uninsured financial service companies and of
possible runs on the commercial paper market, where these companies
would obtain much of their funding.
Discussion also followed Alton Gilbert’s comment about the risk to
monetary service companies in maintaining clearing balances with
foreign banks and allowing daylight overdrafts. A question remains as
to whether monetary service companies can be protected from the risks
in settling the myriad of transactions flowing through a major bank
without seriously damaging the efficiency of the payments mechanism.
Disagreement also emerged on the likelihood and desirability of
bank runs, and how much the discount window can moderate systemic
liquidity problems in banks. One view holds that few bank runs have
taken place in recent years, and that systemic runs on a broad scale are
unlikely because depositors will not demand currency, much less gold.
Also, bank runs are a desirable form of market discipline.
Participants arguing on the other side of the issue cited significant
runs in New England in the recent banking crisis including some with
systemic potential, at least on a regional basis. All appeared to agree that14 Richard E. Randall
withdrawn deposits are likely to remain within the banking system. But
deposit flights from regions and classes of banks could still occur in the
loss recognition phase of financial cycles. With numerous banks in some
degree of trouble, and uncertainty as to solvency, deposit churning
could materially curtail credit availability, deepening economic prob-
lems and increasing the likelihood of unnecessary bank failures.
A similar divergence of views emerged on the level of reliance to be
placed on the discount window. Some who considered bank runs a
remote possibility assume that the Federal Reserve lending operations
could handle any liquidity problems that might arise, and one partici-
pant suggested that this might be done through monetary policy alone,
eliminating the need for the discount window.
The contrary view holds that discount window administrators
would have difficulty distinguishing failing banks from other damaged
banks in a major financial crisis. The task of providing liquidity to
stabilize the system has been made more complicated by the discount
window restrictions imposed by FDICIA.
Robert Litan had raised the issue of the private deposit insurance
proposal advanced by Bert Ely. He thinks the idea deserves public
discussion because it substitutes the market judgments of insurance
syndicates for that of the FDIC. Richard Aspinwall of Chase Manhattan
Bank argued against the proposal on the ground that the system of
insurance syndicates, made up essentially of banks, can be no stronger
than the capital supporting the banking system. Incentive conflicts
could also inhibit large banks, in their role as syndicate members, from
criticizing each others’ practices. Edward Kane of Boston College sup-
ported the concept, if used in conjunction with subordinated debt,
because of concerns for the actions of federal regulators in "political
cycles." His vision of the syndicates could include nonbanks and could
take the form of bonding, reinsurance, or subordinated debt.
Several participants discussed the implications of structural changes
in the financial services sector, including greater competition in tradi-
tional banking services from nonbanks and increasing concern for
government guarantees relating to nonbanks. Edward Ettin of the
Federal Reserve Board staff expressed concern that some of the factors
that gave rise to the safety net for banks now apply to other providers of
financial services, including a propensity for systemic risk. This suggests
consideration of limited federal supervision and discount window
access for some nonbanks. Concern was also expressed about disruption
of financial intermediation by nonbanks in a crisis. Jane D’Arista of
Boston University advocates a limited government guarantee for each
individual against the failure of any type of financial institution, includ-
ing banks. This would be in addition to a guarantee of all transaction
balances in banks.AN OVERVIEW 15
Conclusion and Commentary
The United States has experienced extraordinary problems with
depository institutions in the past 15 or so years. The debate has been
vigorous over what changes should be made to prevent recurrences.
Discussion of the causes of the various banking crises has been domi-
nated by the view that most problems stemmed from moral hazard and
inadequate market discipline, both consequences of the perverse incen-
tives of deposit insurance, and from the supervisory practice of safe-
guarding uninsured depositors in large banks. As a consequence, much
of the debate about reforms has revolved around alternative means of
limiting depositor protections and otherwise enhancing market disci-
pline.
One objective of the symposium was to force a careful examination
of the nature and patterns of the several banking crises. The lead-off
paper attempted to do this and concluded that most of the damage was
done as a consequence of a few financial cycles. A characteristic of such
cycles is that preventing losses requires curtailing risk-taking before
economic forces cause a turn in the cycle. In discussing this paper,
several participants acknowledged that most recent cycles involved
euphoric excesses by bankers and borrowers, although no consensus
emerged as to the underlying reasons. It was suggested that widespread
euphoria in boom periods was a competing explanation for the cause of
recent banking problems, along with the more familiar moral hazard
view.
Five alternative proposals to moderate future problems were dis-
cussed in some detail, of which four were designed to enhance market
discipline. The remaining proposal was for direct supervisory action to
avoid excessive risk concentration in banks during boom periods. A
number of participants were skeptical that supervisors could stand up to
political pressures during a euphoric boom, but few saw harm in
supervisors trying to discourage overconcentration.
No evidence was cited that market forces have reacted against
cyclical risk-taking before it peaked and problems emerged. But market
discipline solutions generally intend to put bank creditors more at risk,
in the expectation that they will then exert timely pressure on bank
management to curtail unwise risk-taking. Proposals advanced at the
symposium were intended to do this with the least potential for
initiating systemic instability. But participants were divided on the
potential for bank runs, undesirable failures of damaged but viable
banks, and procyclical effects on credit availability and economic activity
as a result of bank problems.
Some participants expressed concern that coinsurance would leave
the system vulnerable to systemic problems if depositors at large banks
were forced to take losses. Some feared that the functional banking16 Richard E. Randall
proposal would weaken the efficiency of the payments system (by
eliminating daylight overdrafts), while leaving the bulk of what we now
call banks vulnerable to further financial cycles. Fewer commentators
expressed negative views concerning reliance on subordinated debt, but
questions were raised as to its applicability to smaller banks and the
mechanics of achieving frequent market tests. Related issues include the
potential for instability in a time of crisis if maturing subordinated debt
cannot be rolled over, and the fundamental question of whether the
theory will work in practice and produce timely risk-avoidance.
While opinions expressed at the symposium varied widely as to
whether FDICIA will have a positive or negative effect on bank sound-
ness, there seemed to be a clear consensus that further changes are
needed to safeguard the banking system. The symposium and these
proceedings are intended to be useful in refraining the debate and
keeping attention on the need for further action, even as the banking
problems of the 1980s fade.